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EU transport policy at a crossroads

The cost of liberalisation for climate change and personal mobility

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Mobility is central to the EU core principles of free movement across its territory, especially facilitating mobility between Member States to support the Single Market and cultural exchanges that bring people together. Transport provides the infrastructure that facilitates free movement of goods and people, which in turn generates further integration, both political, economic and cultural (Ross, 1998). Free movement implicitly necessitates liberalisation of transport modes. Liberalisation in aviation, road and rail has replaced inter-governmental and bilateral agreements with new supranational governance frameworks that include cabotage (Stevens, 2004; Kassim and Stevens, 2010; Dyrhauge, 2013b). EU liberalisation of transport modes was separate processes to the Single Market yet helped facilitate the free movement of goods and people that was necessary for a successful implementation of the Single Market.

Transport liberalisation and the creation of EU transport policies, especially road transport, have led to congestion, bottlenecks and increased pollution, thereby generating new challenges for the EU and its Member States, especially as climate change has moved up the political agenda and people have started to push for broader societal and structural changes (Dyrhauge, forthcoming). Yet alternative ideas to free movement represent political taboos (Gössling and Cohen, 2014). Indeed, the European Commission (2011) has stated that curbing movement is not an option. Importantly, restricting mobility would contravene the principles of free movement set out in the Treaties. Instead, the EU has attempted to regulate emissions from cars and lorries, but successful industry lobbyism has weakened the legislation (Friedrich et al., 2000; Warleigh, 2000; Dionigi, 2017; Dyrhauge, 2014). Moreover, growth in traffic and, until recently, the lack of specific climate targets for transport, have created multiple and contradicting challenges not only in terms of climate change but also due to lack of infrastructure investment at the EU level.

The EU's Trans-European Network for Transport (TEN-T) aims to bind the Member States together through a shared infrastructure, thereby creating territorial cohesion (Ross, 1998). Although the TEN-T policy favours rail projects, which are viewed as more environmentally 'friendly' compared to other transport modes, any infrastructure projects represent an increase in supply, which ultimately generates more demand and thus more traffic growth. Moreover, national interests have made it difficult to build large cross-border TEN-T projects.

Simultaneously, the Commission has pushed for a Common Transport Policy since the early 1960s, when it proposed several policies to harmonise national transport policies (Erdmenger, 1981; Abbati, 1987). Until the 1980s, Member States hesitated to adopt the Commission's transport policy proposals concerning market opening and harmonisation (Stevens, 2004). The 1980s change of policy preferences created a synchronised push by the Commission and pull from the Member States that was important for the creation of an EU Transport Policy and thus EU-generated liberalisation (Aspinwall, 1999). Overall, the Commission has actively pursued an EU Transport Policy, but it relies on the legislative actors, the Parliament and the Council to adopt and Member States to implement its policy ideas. Thus, institutional decision-making structures are important for the Commission's agency.

This chapter discusses the relationship between the Commission and the Member States emphasising diverging ideas of transport, which have influenced EU transport policy-making since the Treaty of Rome. The chapter emphasises the role of the Commission and discusses its periodical ability to be a policy entrepreneur, addressing the following three questions: How did we get here? What are the problems today? And what are the future options for EU Transport Policy? To answer these questions, I analyse the development of the EU Transport Policy in relation to the wider integration process, focusing on the challenges facing policy-makers today and how the overarching principles of free movement contradict the Commission's attempts to create a sustainable transport policy. Thus, I argue that fundamental structural changes are necessary, but the entrenched paradigm of transport liberalisation and free movement prevents a shift to a sustainable mobility paradigm.

The first section outlines early development to explain the original role of transport policy in the Community. The second section analyses the liberalisation of transport modes and their impact on mobility. The third section focuses on the current issues of climate change and the challenges facing EU policy-makers today. The fourth section discusses the future directions of EU transport policy. The chapter concludes by identifying the multiple contradicting policy aims which prevent EU Transport Policy from moving from a liberalised market focused on growth to a sustainable transport area.

Attempts to develop a Common Transport Policy (1960s–1970s)

In the early post-World War Two period, cross-border traffic was regulated by governments, who had established bilateral agreements on quotas and tariffs for cross-border traffic. Moreover, most transport occurred within a country, with little cross-border traffic (Stevens, 2004: 36). Despite limited cross-border and international transport, the Spaak report from 1956 shows that the founding fathers wanted the Community executive to establish a Common Transport Policy (Abbati, 1987: 30). The Spaak report focused on three aspects of transport: "no discrimination on ground of origin or destination in charging for EC passengers or freight; the development and financing of infrastructure investment; the formulation of a common transport policy" (Stevens, 2004: 37). The founding Member States believed that transport policy could not be regulated as a 'normal' economic sector (Erdmenger, 1981) and that it would be impossible to liberalise the transport sectors within the rules of the general services (Abbati, 1987: 34). Thus, the chapter on a Common Transport Policy set out in the Treaty of Rome represented a long-term vision for the European Economic Community, where the creation of a single market would require a Common Transport Policy to facilitate increased personal mobility and movement of goods.

The framework for the Common Transport Policy chapter in the Treaty of Rome was vague due to the diverging national transport principles ranging from laissez-faire (the Netherlands),

interventionist (West Germany) and centralised (France) (Abbati, 1987: 18). These different transport principles made it difficult for the Commission to establish a Common Transport Policy, which was evident in the Commission's first transport policy strategy paper, the 1961 Schaus Memorandum, named after Transport Commissioner Lambert Schaus, which set out the general lines of a Common Transport Policy (Abbati, 1987: 53–55). The Schaus Memorandum was meant to harmonise the strictly controlled domestic transport markets and international freight, thereby establishing Community rules (European Commission, 1961). Yet the Memorandum did not present specific legislation; instead, it represented the Commission's vision for a future Common Transport Policy, similar to more recent white papers. Specifically, the Schaus Memorandum aimed to gradually replace national transport policies with community policies to support economic integration, thereby moving from negative integration that removed existing national rules to positive integration that established new community-wide legislation which would harmonise national transport legislation at the Community level (European Commission, 1961). The overall aim was to remove barriers to trade that obstructed the free flow of goods within the Community and establish a Community framework to support free movements, mainly in freight. The focus on passenger liberalisation only emerged in the 1980s.

The Commission was unable to gain support from the Council because Member States did not believe that their transport policies had failed. By comparison, national agriculture polices had failed and national governments had imposed rationing due to scarcity of food during and after World War Two. Consequently, the Common Agriculture Policy flourished, whilst the Common Transport Policy struggled to take off (Lindberg and Scheingold, 1972: 28). Furthermore, many European countries viewed transport policy as a public service that could not be left to private actors to regulate, and national governments took an active role in regulating traffic through quota and tariffs (Stevens, 2004). Overall, "Member States espoused divergent political philosophies about transport markets (harmonisation versus liberalisation, state-led versus market driven) and had limited resources (state financing or private investment)" (Stephenson, 2010: 1041). The logic of diversity (Stephenson, 2010: 1041) increased after the first enlargement in 1973 where the United Kingdom, Ireland and Denmark became members and continued to prevent any real movement towards a Common Transport Policy.

Subsequent legislative initiatives throughout the 1960s and 1970s were adopted in piecemeal, focusing on negative integration in road and rail transport. Much of the adopted legislation during this period focused on road haulage (Erdmenger, 1981: 32), yet without a strategic framework or direction, instead EU policy-makers harmonised rules on non-controversial issues such as technical aspects and quota systems, including tariffs and customs (Stevens, 2004). The period also saw a general societal shift in the modal balance between rail and road, where the post-war economic boom led to increased car ownership, which provided people with more flexibility, leading to more investment in road infrastructure. At the same time, post-war industries moved to the outskirts of town and near new road junctions that contributed to the increased urban sprawl.

By comparison, the railways have historically strengthened social and territorial cohesion, just as they enabled industrial developments and state-building in the 19th century (Dobbin, 1994; Ross, 1998: 6). The post-World War Two era saw a decline in rail traffic and investments; crucially, national railways continued to incur debts, which made it difficult for them to maintain service levels, leading to line closure and poor infrastructure maintenance (Dyrhauge, 2013b). Moreover, "the displacement in [rail] has also been dramatic in policy terms because it has highlighted the sharp discrepancy between economic efficiency and social considerations" (Ross, 1998: 4). Today, public service obligations remain crucial for many railway services, even in Member States with opened domestic passenger markets. Moreover, most railways remain

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state-owned companies with monopolistic market positions, except for the United Kingdom, where the Major government in 1994 liberalised and privatised British Rail (Dyrhauge, 2013b). Public ownership means that national governments are responsible for any failure in their railway companies and infrastructure (Stevens, 2004; Dyrhauge, 2013b). Thus, the railways have always been politically important for national governments, and Member States have opposed the Commission's EU Railway Policy initiatives because they wanted to protect their railways. Simultaneously, national governments favoured road building due to increased car ownership, and from a multi-level governance perspective, the Member States created countervailing policy actions, leading to further decline of the railways.

Institutional legislative procedures (unanimity in the Council) prevented the Commission from establishing a Common Transport Policy, whereas the European Court of Justice (ECJ) played a crucial role in the early days of the Community and often supported the Commission's cases. In 1972, the Court established the principle that the European Community has competence for external relations in areas where it has an internal policy (Stevens, 2004: 48). In 1974, the Court supported the Commission's claim that air and maritime transport policies apply to the Treaties (Stevens, 2004: 123–125). These rulings became important for the Commission, which used them to further its political agenda. In the early 1980s, the Commission received help from the European Parliament, which had sent its criticism of the Council's failure to establish a Common Transport Policy to the ECJ, which ruled in favour of the Parliament. The ruling came at a time of heighted activities leading to the Single European Act and the creation of the Single Market, thereby creating a window of opportunity for the Commission to liberalise the transport sectors and proceed with positive integration.

Liberalisation and the development of an EU Transport Policy (1980s)

In 1985, under the guise of the Single European Market programme, the Commission published a transport white paper which aimed to liberalise national transport markets (Ross, 1998: 52). This time Member States supported the Commission's proposal to create an EU Transport Policy not only because of the ECJ ruling but also due to exogenous pressure such as global trends of deregulation; new industry practices, for example, just-in-time productions; and increased competitiveness from third countries, for example, Japan and South Korea. This generated a push for the creation of new EU transport regulations as liberalisation and privatisation gained dominance amongst policy-makers. Overall, these exogenous shifts in policy preferences towards deregulation and liberalisation created a push for sectoral policy reform at national level, which the Commission used to gain support for positive European integration (Aspinwall, 1999).

Jacques Delors, the dynamic president of the Commission, and DG Transport actively pursued a European transport area by pushing for investment in "high-speed rail infrastructures; successfully demystifying transport and reframing it as a vehicle of economic growth; coupling transport with the political vision of the single market; reducing uncertainty by presenting proposals as package deals" (Stephenson, 2010: 1047). Overall, transport played a crucial role in facilitating the aims of the Single European Act and protecting European industries against external competitors. Moreover, the Commission pursued deeper integration that aimed to transform the airlines and the railways through stepwise liberalisation processes that gradually opened the sectors to competition (Kassim and Stevens, 2010; Dyrhauge, 2013b).

EU air transport was liberalised between 1984 and 1992 (Kassim and Stevens, 2010). The liberalisation of US airline policy created an exogenous push for EU policy initiatives.

Simultaneously, a liberal coalition amongst the Member States that included the United Kingdom and Netherlands enabled the Commission to use the window of opportunity generated by the ECJ's ruling to pursue EU airline liberalisation (Kassim and Stevens, 2010: 81). Crucially, the Single European Sky programme created a paradigm shift from the Chicago Convention's inter-governmental framework to a supranational EU Aviation Policy, giving the Commission more powers. Moreover, airline liberalisation benefitted the consumers, as new low-cost airlines emerged, offering low fares, thereby creating growth in aviation, especially in leisure travel, as more people could afford weekend breaks in big European cities. Overall, the Single European Sky programme has restructured the industry, created new business opportunities and dismantled the traditional flag carrier system (Kassim and Stevens, 2010: 270). Thus, the EU Aviation Policy shows the Commission's successful policy entrepreneurship.

Compared to the airlines, the railways did not experience an exogenous push for change, and the Commission has not been as successful in liberalising the railways. The Council took the first step towards rail liberalisation in 1991, when it adopted directive 91/440. The directive forms the foundation for EU railway market opening. It separated the railway infrastructure management and operations financially and later organisationally by creating transparent and separate decision-making systems. Throughout the 1990s, the Council rejected attempts by the Commission to push railway liberalisation (Dyrhauge, 2013b). In 2001, the Council and European Parliament adopted the first railway package, but they only adopted the fourth and final liberalisation package in 2016, which sets out the rules and date for opening domestic passenger services. This makes EU railway liberalisation one of longest liberalisation processes at the EU level, lasting 25 years from when Directive 1991/440 was adopted until the fourth-railway package was adopted in 2016. Crucially, most rail traffic remains national (European Commission, 2019b: 6), just as the railways are politically important for domestic politics. Unlike other public monopolies that is, airlines, telecommunication and energy, there has been no pressure to liberalise or indeed privatise the railways. Instead, the logic of diversity continues to govern the Council and prevents it from making any radical changes in the sector (Knill and Lehmkuhl, 2000: 67; Dyrhauge, 2013b).

In general, the deepening integration of transport policies demonstrates the links between different transport modes and the necessity to move from silo thinking towards more policy coordination, for example, in terms of European infrastructure planning (Ross, 1998). The Spaak report had already in the 1950s mentioned a European infrastructure, but it took another 40 years before the Commission had an opportunity to pursue trans-European transport infrastructure TEN-T projects. In the 1990s, Commission Vice-President Henning Christoffersen headed a high-level group responsible for identifying TEN-T projects that could add value to the Community (Dyrhauge, 2013b: 115–116). Most of the selected priority projects were railway projects, which the Commission viewed as more environmentally friendly.

The deliberate expansion of EU Transport Policy into infrastructure projects and investment as a means to create social and territorial cohesions makes TEN-T a cultivated spillover because of the Commission's agency in cultivating a new policy that expanded the EU's competences (Stephenson, 2010). The idea of cultivating EU territorial cohesion is similar to traditional state building, yet the EU faces three difficulties in achieving its goals. First, infrastructure building is a national competence, and the Commission does not have any influence in how or when national governments invest in large expensive infrastructure projects. Second, the EU budget does not have money to finance the projects in full. Indeed, the cohesion funds and TEN-T funds only finance 10–20% of total construction cost, and the involved Member States have to pay for most of the projects. Third, the political agendas in Member States are often not synchronic with each other, which prevents an agreement to build large cross-border

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infrastructure projects. The Fehmarn Bridge is a case in point, where Denmark has promoted the Fehmarn Bridge for many years, whereas the German government has hesitated in approving the connection due to complex national policy processes and a general lack of political commitment to the project. This was also the case for the Channel Tunnel until a short window of opportunity enabled the British and French governments to sign a bilateral agreement that enabled the construction to begin (Quinet and Vickerman, 1997: 16). The Channel Tunnel has created new cross-border traffic between France, the United Kingdom and Belgium; it has reduced demand for short-haul air traffic between London-Paris and Brussels-London, thereby representing a successful TEN-T project.

Another success story is the Øresund Bridge, which has increased cross-border traffic, especially commuting, between Sweden and Denmark. The bridge has contributed to inter-regional collaboration through the Øresund regional projects that include local and regional authorities and businesses (Matthiessen, 2004). Moreover, the bridge inspired the popular crime series 'Broen/Bron', which was a collaboration between several Scandinavian public broadcasting companies. However, in recent years, both Denmark and Sweden have reintroduced border controls. In early 2016, the Swedish government reintroduced passport controls due to the increased influx of refugees, and in 2019, Denmark reintroduced passport controls due to cross-border gang shootings in Copenhagen. The border controls have created barriers for the daily commuters who use the regional train services between Scania and the greater Copenhagen area.

In general, the successful implementation of large European infrastructure projects depends on political and financial commitment from national governments. The Commission (1961, 1992, 2001, 2011) has consistently pursued a transport policy at the Community level, which would entail a shift from national to shared governance or supranational governance (Whitelegg, 1988; Erdmenger, 1981; Abbati, 1987; Stevens, 2004). The Commission's refocus from a common transport policy to an EU transport policy reflects the different levels of EU integration in transport modes and the continued diversity at the national level despite liberalisation. Instead of a supranational common transport policy, EU Transport Policy, today, represents multi-level governance with continued diverging national transport philosophies, although there has been a convergence over time, which has allowed the Commission to achieve deregulation and create EU frameworks for different transport modes.

Tensions between EU transport liberalisation and environmental protection (1992–2014)

The Commission has tried to address the negative environmental externalities of transport since the early 1990s. Simultaneously deregulating transport markets have led to more traffic, air pollution and noise, with negative consequences for public health. The EU has attempted to mitigate transport emissions, but strong industry lobbyism has led to weak environmental legislation (Dionigi, 2017), and the 2011 Eurovignette Directive, which aims to harmonise environmental charges for lorries, includes weak elements of the 'polluters pay' principle (Dyrhauge, 2014). Instead, reducing transport pollution has predominantly been a national competence, and transport was not included in central international climate agreements, for example, the Kyoto Protocol and the Paris Agreement. Simultaneously, the EU has unsuccessfully tried to create a global emission trading system for the aviation sector, but the members of the International Civil Aviation Organisation have consistently opposed the idea (Lindenthal, 2014). Indeed, it is only in recent years that transport has become integral in international climate change discussions, mainly because transport pollution continues to grow, whilst pollution from most other

sectors has declined (European Commission, 2019a: 142). This puts pressure on all transport modes to radically change their fuel consumption before 2050, where the EU aims to be a zero-carbon economy.

The Commission's transport white papers, which are ten-year policy strategies, emphasise the negative environmental dimension of transport growth and attempt to solve the tension between the economic growth paradigm and a desire to reduce the negative environmental impact of transport. The 1992 Transport White Paper on sustainable mobility identified these tensions and recognised some of the challenges posed by continued economic growth and traffic growth, most notably environmental policy integration (European Commission, 1992: 5), which was part of the fifth Environmental Action Programme (Weale et al., 2000: 119). Indeed, both the Fifth Environmental Action Programme and the 1992 Transport White Paper recognised the need for more policy coordination between the different Directorates-General in the Commission, where DG Environment and DG Transport, at the time, appeared to have worked together towards these shared goals of more environmental policy integration (Dyrhauge, 2013a; 139–140). The balance between environmental protection and the overarching economic goals of the EU favours the Single Market, and environmental policy discourses are often met with counterarguments of economic and employment concerns. For example, the Commission acknowledges the problems of traffic growth for congestion and pollution whilst simultaneously stating that the "traffic growth demonstrate the underline importance of the sector to the continued health of the Community's economy" (European Commission, 1992: 10). The policies adopted during the 1990s focused on deregulation and market liberalisation, thereby only exacerbating the contradicting policy actions, mainly in the liberalised road haulage and aviation sectors (Dyrhauge, 2013a: 142). The uneven sectoral developments influenced infrastructure use, with congestion in some areas, predominantly roads, and decline in others, mainly rail infrastructure.

The 2001 Transport White Paper (European Commission, 2001), again, aimed to address the tensions in EU Transport Policy – liberalisation and traffic growth versus environmental protection – by reducing congestion through modal shift, thereby decoupling economic growth and traffic growth. Shifting modal balance from the dominant road transport to alternative forms of transport necessitates regulatory measures to make road transport less attractive for the users, for example, by increasing prices (e.g. taxes and charges) and simultaneously reducing the price and increasing the availability of alternative transport modes, thereby pushing users towards alternative transport modes (Holden, 2007). Modal shift requires constant regulatory measures to prevent a rebound effect, because users internalise the extra cost of using the road infrastructure and then return to their cars (Banister et al., 2000; Holden, 2007). Furthermore, "the modal shift policy and concerns about the hegemonic position of road and focus on air emissions increased the opportunity for railways to take a more hegemonic position" (Dyrhauge, 2013a: 143). However, the Commission's attempts to revitalise the railways failed due to the logic of diversity between national governments' railway philosophies, which prevented the Council from adopting EU railway market opening during the 2000s.

Predictably, modal shift was controversial, and the stakeholders, except for environmental groups and the railway sector, objected to this idea, which the Commission subsequently abandoned in 2006 and in 2011 returned to the efficiency argument (Dyrhauge, 2013a). The 2011 Transport White Paper clearly stated that curbing mobility was not an option; rather, the Commission wanted to find technological solutions to make transport more efficient and to create multi-modal transport hubs by linking different transport modes better, for example, creating a hub around an airport or harbour (European Commission, 2011). Moreover, the central and eastern enlargements in 2004 and 2007 added new Member States with old infrastructures that

are inadequate to meet modern transport demand. The overall themes in the 2011 Transport White Paper were competiveness, efficiency and sustainability. In other words, the tensions between economic and environmental priorities remained, but the policy focus shifted back to economic concerns of competitiveness with the solutions of making transport more efficient. Given the financial and economic crises at the time, this was predictable.

Similarly, the EU 2030 climate and energy package was less ambitious compared to the 2020 package due to dominant economic concerns both in the Commission and in the Council (Bürgin, 2015). The Council and Parliament later strengthened the renewable energy goals for 2030, where transport plays an indirect role through the national targets on emission reductions, and each Member State decides how to reduce its emissions and which sectors to focus on. Although the EU has tried to reduce transport emission for vans, lorries and cars, the Dieselgate scandal showed that EU legislation was weak, allowing for administrative malpractice at both the EU and national level (European Parliament, 2017). Similar, the 2009 Biofuel Directive's goal of 10% biofuel in cars by 2020 has not been implemented in many Member States, and the EU's carpark continues to rely on fossil fuels.

Overall, the 2011 Transport White Paper shifted the focus to socio-technological solutions, which aimed to support new innovative technologies such as alternative fuels and smart mobility (European Commission, 2011). This policy approach represents a bottom-up process with more focus on industrial policy and reflect the prioritisation of technological innovation, whereas the modal shift approach represents a top-down regulatory approach that directs transport behaviour. The Commission has unsuccessfully tried to solve the inherent contradictions in EU transport policy and the increasing problems with pollution and congestion. Moreover, its attempts to use sustainable development by bridging the economy, social equality and environmental protection failed (Baker, 2007), and the Commission's transport policy actions have exacerbated the problems due to the underlying principles of economic growth and competitiveness that guide all EU policy-making.

Challenges for the future of EU transport policy

Climate change has started to dominate policy-making at different levels of governance, including the EU, where discussions of the speed and direction of the energy transition entail changes to mobility and transport policies. As the previous section has shown, the Commission has unsuccessfully tried to bring environmental protection and liberalisation together. However, the political goal to achieve a low-carbon society by 2050 necessitates wide societal and economic structural changes, including reducing the transport sector's reliance on fossil fuels. Much of this change is driven by technological innovation instead of addressing structural issues in societies, but the overall transition needs to ensure that everyone is able to take part in the process.

The dominant policy discussions and public discourses on climate change and energy transition continue to follow an economic growth paradigm, with some environmental groups and researchers trying to challenge this dominant policy priority. This is also the case in transport, where the "the entrapment of transport within a neoliberal growth paradigm . . . appears to prevent a more fundamental discussion of the obstacles that to be overcome to implement significant mitigation policies" (Gössling and Cohen, 2014: 204). Indeed, transport taboos prevent any discussion of future alternative societal structures and changes to mobility partly due to the dominant role of industry lobbying, which advocates for technological solutions to societal problems, especially with regard to climate change (Gössling and Cohen, 2014: 204). Similar, free movement of goods and persons prevents any discussions of alternative mobility paradigms.

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Consumer choice is important to achieve a low-carbon society by 2050. For example, there is a link between the choice of car and gasoline use relating to "mileage as a key factor in the cultural significance of automobiles, a symbolic indication of one's orientation toward consumption or conservation" (Goodwin, 2010: 64). This symbolism is evident in the personal choice of car, whether that is an SUV, hybrid or electrical car. Both the oil sector and car manufacturers have an interest in protecting existing technologies, and they have actively lobbied EU institutions, which was evident in the auto-oil I programme that aimed to reduce emissions and fuel use in vans (Friedrich et al., 2000). Simultaneously, the Dieselgate scandal has shown how much time and effort European car manufacturers will use to circumvent emission regulations instead of finding new innovative technologies (Dyrhauge, forthcoming), thereby protecting status quo. Today, electrical cars are getting bigger, with higher mileage between recharging. Tesla is working on producing a pickup truck that will enable the company to compete in the SUV market. Thus, these technological innovations create tension between new and old industry actors.

In general, the transport sector is changing as new forms of mobility are emerging, including Über, car share, smart vehicles (e.g. automatic cars), electric vehicles, transport planning apps and recently consumer demands for more international rail services, including night trains. Technological innovations play a big role in this transition, although old industries have resisted change by arguing for lower ambitions and longer transition periods to restructure their employment and supply chains (Dyrhauge, forthcoming). In the meantime, new industry actors and third countries, such as China, have focused on new battery technologies to reduce reliance on oil. Simultaneously, the climate change agenda has pressured old established industries to adapt in order to survive.

This begs the question of what role EU policy-makers should have in facilitating sustainable transitions. More precisely, how should the EU control the speed and direction of the energy transition? For example, should it adopt a top-down approach that bets on a specific technology or a bottom-up approach like a multi-level perspective (Geels, 2011) that leaves the speed and direction up to industries? The latter approach entails a principle of technology neutrality (Azar and Sanden, 2011) instead of championing specific industries or technologies, as suggested by the first approach. The EU attempts to bridge both approaches, which is evident in the 2016 sustainable mobility packages and Commission industrial policy strategies, where the Commission pursues technologically neutral policies that leave it to the industry to find the best low-carbon fuel technologies (Dyrhauge, forthcoming). Simultaneously, the Commission has created the European Battery Alliance to promote European battery companies that are facing competition from abroad.

Crucially, the responsibility for the transition to a low-carbon transport area is split between several Directorates-General (DGs) in the Commission. DG Grow is responsible for industrial policies and European competitiveness, whereas DG Move is responsible for EU modal transport policies, DG Energy is responsible for EU energy policy and DG Climate Action is responsible for EU climate policy. All four Directorates-General are important for a successful energy transition. Thus they need to cooperate and coordinate policy initiatives in order to prevent contradictory policies that will prevent the EU from reaching its 2030 and 2050 goals for phasing in electrical vehicles that will increase electricity demand and demand for electric cars. Similar, energy transition in the transport sectors requires technological innovation in the car industry, investment in energy infrastructure (charging points and renewable energies) and investment in cross-border rail services to compete with short-haul airlines. However, the coordination between the responsible DGs is lacking (Gössling et al., 2016), which makes it difficult to reach the political climate and energy policy goals. Importantly, the EU has to adopt

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legislation today to meet its 2030 policy objectives, because the lifespan of investments and vehicles reaches beyond 2030. Thus, policy decisions today impact the EU's ability to meet its climate and energy goals in 2030 and even 2050.

Sustainable and energy transitions affect personal mobility, as people might have to find new forms of transport. Here transport justice (Martens, 2017; Pereira et al., 2017) is important because it emphasises affordability and accessibility to infrastructure, thereby enabling personal mobility for all, including high-mobility and low-mobility persons in both urban and rural areas. However, mobility is often regulated through pricing mechanisms such as taxes, charges and investment in public transport, which are national competences under the subsidiarity principle. Thus, the decarbonisation of EU Transport Policy relies on individual Member States' actions: yet Member States are simultaneously constrained by the EU. This can be seen in the public discussions about environmental taxes on airline tickets, where not all types of regulations comply with EU rules, thereby preventing Member States from adopting unilateral environmental airline taxes. Simultaneously some Member States want an EU framework and other Member States do not want expensive airline tickets. These different policy ideas and competences make it difficult to create an EU framework that incorporates 'polluter pays' charges/taxes or even an international framework to reduce airline emissions.

Furthermore, both the 2004 enlargement (Burns et al., 2013) and financial crises have extended the logic of diversity to climate actions (Burgin, 2015). Indeed, "it is clear that the combined effects of enlargement and the economic crisis have reduced the EU's appetite for ambitious environmental policy" (Burns et al., 2020: 15). For example, countries like Poland resist energy transition to protect its coal industry, which in turn prevents other Member States from proceeding with a more ambitious framework and thereby create a reverse joint decision trap. In short, the tensions between industries and the climate change agenda continue to put pressure on the Commission's policy entrepreneurship and ability to create an EU sustainable transport area.

Conclusion

The Commission has actively pursued an integrationist transport policy since the beginning. However, its efforts have been constrained by the EU institutional design as the Council, that is, Member States, repeatedly rejected proposals to harmonise and liberalise transport markets, thereby limiting the Commission's ability as a policy entrepreneur. Instead, exogenous factors and global political trends like liberalisation and privatisation, together with the creation of the Single Market, enabled the Commission to finally, in the 1980s, successfully pursue positive integration in roads and aviation. In other words, the Commission's agency was contingent on external factors to change the Council's position. Thus, the institutional dynamics between the three EU actors are important for policy developments.

The political agenda has prioritised competitiveness and liberalisation, which have generated traffic growth for both goods and passengers, especially in the road and aviation sectors, whilst the railways continued to decline despite the Commission's attempts to revitalise them. This political growth agenda has had negative effects on the environment, which the Commission has tried to address through market-based regulations to reduce emissions because neither modal shift nor curbing mobility is possible due to the overarching principles of free movement in the Treaties. Moreover, the promotion of new technologies has become central to EU climate mitigation and energy transition, thereby continuing to support a growth paradigm in transport.

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Overall, this growth paradigm emphasising free movements has created a path dependency which contradicts the increased demands for climate action in the field of EU Transport Policy. This chapter has shown how the Commission has attempted to strengthen its environmental protection in transport, yet economic concerns and socio-technical solutions continue to dominate, leading to weak environmental solutions. Overall, the EU is an ostrich living in a glass house and hiding its head in the sand instead of reacting to its own data and analyses, which show that its transport policy will not meet its 2030 and 2050 climate and energy policy goals. So far, the EU has not solved the transport sector's climate challenges; instead, its regulatory and technological approach to a low-emission society does not discuss the need for structural changes to mobility patterns. This myopic perspective on policy-making makes it difficult to solve long-term challenges not only in EU Transport Policy but also in mitigating climate change.

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